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详解Xss 及SpringBoot 防范Xss攻击(附全部代码)
嗯,我现在要详细理解XSS攻击以及如何在Spring Boot中防范它。首先,我需要先了解XSS是什么。XSS全称是跨站脚本攻击,对吧?攻击者通过注入恶意脚本到网页中,当其他用户访问时,这些脚本就会执行,可能窃取用户的信息,比如cookies,或者进行其他恶意操作。那XSS主要分几种类型呢?我记得有存储型、反射型和DOM型三种。存储型XSS是把恶意脚本存储到服务器,比如数据库里,当其他用户访问某个页面时,脚本从服务器加载并执行。反射型XSS则是将恶意脚本作为参数附加在URL里,用户点击这样的链接,服务器将参数返回并执行。DOM型XSS不经过服务器,完全是前端处理不当导致的,比如JS操作DOM时插入了恶意内容。
接下来,我需要思考如何在Spring Boot应用中防范这些攻击。常见的防御方法有输入验证、输出编码、使用安全框架等。输入验证应该在数据进入系统时就进行检查,过滤或拒绝含有可疑脚本的输入。输出编码则是在将数据展示到页面时,对特殊字符进行转义,这样浏览器就不会把它们当作脚本执行了。比如将<转义成<;,>转义成>;等。Spring Boot中可能有相关的库或者过滤器可以实现这些功能。
另外,HTTP头中的Content Security Policy(CSP)也是一种有效的防御手段,可以限制页面只能加载指定来源的资源,减少XSS的风险。设置CSP可以通过响应头来实现,比如Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self',这样浏览器只会执行同源的脚本。
Spring Boot中,可能需要使用过滤器来对请求参数进行过滤,或者使用转义库来处理输出。例如,可以使用Spring的HtmlUtils来转义HTML字符。或者使用像OWASP的Java Encoder库,它提供了更全面的编码方法。
现在具体到代码层面,我需要考虑如何实现这些防御措施。比如,可以创建一个XSS过滤器,对请求中的参数进行清理,去除或转义潜在的恶意标签。在Spring中,可以通过实现Filter接口,并在doFilter方法中处理请求的参数。需要注意的是,这种方式可能会对性能有一定影响,但为了安全,这是必要的。
对于输出编码,在Thymeleaf模板引擎中,默认已经进行了转义,但如果是使用JSP或者其他模板引擎,可能需要手动处理。或者在返回JSON数据时,确保前端正确处理了转义,避免将未转义的数据直接插入到DOM中。
另外,使用Spring Security是否有相关的配置可以帮助防范XSS?比如设置HTTP头,包括CSP、X-XSS-Protection等。X-XSS-Protection头可以启用浏览器的内置XSS过滤功能,虽然现代浏览器可能已经默认开启,但明确设置也是一个好习惯。
现在,我需要整合这些思路,写出具体的代码示例。比如,如何创建一个XSS过滤器,如何配置CSP头,如何处理输入和输出。可能还需要考虑对JSON数据的处理,比如使用Jackson的序列化器在返回数据时自动转义HTML字符。
可能的步骤是:
1. 添加OWASP Java Encoder依赖到项目中。
2. 创建XSS过滤器,对请求参数进行过滤。
3. 配置Spring Security来设置安全相关的HTTP头。
4. 在模板引擎中确保输出编码。
5. 对JSON响应进行处理,转义特殊字符。
在过滤器中,需要覆盖所有的请求参数,包括GET和POST的参数,以及JSON请求体。对于JSON请求体,可能需要使用HttpServletRequestWrapper来包装请求,以便多次读取输入流。
例如,过滤器可以检查每个参数的值,使用ESAPI或Encoder库进行清理。或者,更高效的方式是使用已有的XSS防护库,比如Apache Commons Text的StringEscapeUtils,但需要注意其是否足够全面。
另外,需要考虑性能问题,频繁的字符串替换可能影响性能,尤其是在处理大请求体时。因此,过滤器的实现需要高效,并且只处理必要的字段。
还有,如何处理富文本内容?比如用户需要提交HTML内容,这时候不能简单地转义所有HTML标签,而是需要允许安全的标签,这时候需要使用像JSoup这样的库来过滤HTML,只允许特定的标签和属性。
所以,可能需要两种处理方式:对于普通输入字段,进行严格的转义;对于富文本字段,使用白名单过滤。
总结一下,防范XSS需要综合多种措施,包括输入验证、输出编码、CSP头的设置,以及使用安全的开发实践。在Spring Boot中,可以通过过滤器、安全配置、模板引擎的自动转义,以及处理JSON数据的转义来实现全面的防护。
现在,我需要把这些思路转化为具体的代码示例。首先,创建XSS过滤器,处理请求参数。然后配置Spring Security来设置安全头。添加依赖,比如OWASP Encoder和JSoup。编写测试案例来验证防御是否有效。
可能遇到的挑战包括处理不同的请求类型(如表单提交、JSON),确保所有潜在的攻击向量都被覆盖。此外,需要确保过滤器在Spring Boot应用中正确注册,并处理所有必要的路径。
最后,给出完整的代码示例,说明每一步的实现,并解释其作用。这样读者可以复制代码并应用到自己的项目中,同时理解背后的原理。
详解XSS及SpringBoot防范XSS攻击
一、XSS攻击概述
XSS(Cross-Site Scripting)跨站脚本攻击,攻击者通过注入恶意脚本到网页中,当用户浏览时执行恶意代码,可能导致数据窃取、会话劫持等。
XSS类型:
- 存储型XSS:恶意脚本存储在服务器(如数据库),用户访问页面时执行。
- 反射型XSS:恶意脚本作为URL参数发送到服务器,返回后执行。
- DOM型XSS:前端JavaScript处理不当导致,不经过服务器。
二、Spring Boot防范XSS方案
综合使用输入过滤、输出编码、HTTP安全头等手段。
1. 添加依赖
使用OWASP Java Encoder处理编码,JSoup过滤HTML。
org.owasp.encoder
encoder
1.2.3
org.jsoup
jsoup
1.15.3
2. XSS过滤器(过滤请求参数)
创建过滤器处理请求参数和JSON内容。
import org.owasp.encoder.Encode;
import javax.servlet.*;
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest;
import java.io.IOException;
public class XssFilter implements Filter {
@Override
public void doFilter(ServletRequest request, ServletResponse response, FilterChain chain)
throws IOException, ServletException {
chain.doFilter(new XssRequestWrapper((HttpServletRequest) request), response);
}
// 包装请求,处理参数
static class XssRequestWrapper extends HttpServletRequestWrapper {
public XssRequestWrapper(HttpServletRequest request) {
super(request);
}
@Override
public String getParameter(String name) {
String value = super.getParameter(name);
return value != null ? Encode.forHtml(value) : null;
}
@Override
public String[] getParameterValues(String name) {
String[] values = super.getParameterValues(name);
if (values == null) return null;
return Arrays.stream(values).map(Encode::forHtml).toArray(String[]::new);
}
}
}
注册过滤器:
@Configuration
public class FilterConfig {
@Bean
public FilterRegistrationBean xssFilter() {
FilterRegistrationBean bean = new FilterRegistrationBean<>();
bean.setFilter(new XssFilter());
bean.addUrlPatterns("/*");
return bean;
}
}
3. 输出编码(Thymeleaf自动转义)
Thymeleaf默认转义HTML,无需额外配置。手动编码使用Encode.forHtml()。
@Controller
public class DemoController {
@GetMapping("/demo")
public String demo(Model model, @RequestParam String input) {
model.addAttribute("safeInput", Encode.forHtml(input));
return "demo";
}
}
4. 处理JSON响应
配置Jackson转义HTML字符。
@Configuration
public class WebConfig implements WebMvcConfigurer {
@Override
public void configureMessageConverters(List> converters) {
converters.add(new MappingJackson2HttpMessageConverter(createJacksonObjectMapper()));
}
private ObjectMapper createJacksonObjectMapper() {
ObjectMapper mapper = new ObjectMapper();
mapper.getFactory().setCharacterEscapes(new HtmlCharacterEscapes());
return mapper;
}
static class HtmlCharacterEscapes extends CharacterEscapes {
private final int[] escapes;
public HtmlCharacterEscapes() {
escapes = CharacterEscapes.standardAsciiEscapesForJSON();
escapes['<'] = CharacterEscapes.ESCAPE_STANDARD;
escapes['>'] = CharacterEscapes.ESCAPE_STANDARD;
escapes['&'] = CharacterEscapes.ESCAPE_STANDARD;
escapes['\"'] = CharacterEscapes.ESCAPE_STANDARD;
escapes['\''] = CharacterEscapes.ESCAPE_STANDARD;
}
@Override
public int[] getEscapeCodesForAscii() {
return escapes;
}
@Override
public boolean[] getEscapeCodesForDuplicates() {
return null;
}
}
}
5. 富文本过滤(允许安全HTML)
使用JSoup白名单过滤。
import org.jsoup.Jsoup;
import org.jsoup.safety.Safelist;
public class HtmlSanitizer {
public static String sanitize(String html) {
return Jsoup.clean(html, Safelist.basic()
.addTags("div", "p")
.addAttributes("a", "href", "title"));
}
}
// 使用示例
String safeHtml = HtmlSanitizer.sanitize(userInput);
6. 配置HTTP安全头(Spring Security)
启用CSP、X-XSS-Protection等头。
@Configuration
@EnableWebSecurity
public class SecurityConfig extends WebSecurityConfigurerAdapter {
@Override
protected void configure(HttpSecurity http) throws Exception {
http.headers()
.contentSecurityPolicy("default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'")
.and()
.xssProtection()
.block(true);
}
}
三、测试验证
发送含恶意脚本的请求,检查是否被转义或过滤。
GET /demo?input=
响应应为转义后的文本:
四、总结
- 输入过滤:使用过滤器清理请求参数。
- 输出编码:模板引擎自动转义或手动编码。
- JSON处理:配置Jackson转义特殊字符。
- 富文本处理:JSoup白名单过滤。
- HTTP头:启用CSP、X-XSS-Protection。
通过综合应用以上措施,可有效防御XSS攻击,确保Spring Boot应用的安全性。
附录:
/**
* 转义和反转义工具类
*
* @author lh
*/
public class EscapeUtil
{
public static final String RE_HTML_MARK = "(<[^<]*?>)|(<[\\s]*?/[^<]*?>)|(<[^<]*?/[\\s]*?>)";
private static final char[][] TEXT = new char[64][];
static
{
for (int i = 0; i < 64; i++)
{
TEXT[i] = new char[] { (char) i };
}
// special HTML characters
TEXT['\''] = "'".toCharArray(); // 单引号
TEXT['"'] = """.toCharArray(); // 双引号
TEXT['&'] = "&".toCharArray(); // &符
TEXT['<'] = "<".toCharArray(); // 小于号
TEXT['>'] = ">".toCharArray(); // 大于号
}
/**
* 转义文本中的HTML字符为安全的字符
*
* @param text 被转义的文本
* @return 转义后的文本
*/
public static String escape(String text)
{
return encode(text);
}
/**
* 还原被转义的HTML特殊字符
*
* @param content 包含转义符的HTML内容
* @return 转换后的字符串
*/
public static String unescape(String content)
{
return decode(content);
}
/**
* 清除所有HTML标签,但是不删除标签内的内容
*
* @param content 文本
* @return 清除标签后的文本
*/
public static String clean(String content)
{
return new HTMLFilter().filter(content);
}
/**
* Escape编码
*
* @param text 被编码的文本
* @return 编码后的字符
*/
private static String encode(String text)
{
if (StringUtils.isEmpty(text))
{
return StringUtils.EMPTY;
}
final StringBuilder tmp = new StringBuilder(text.length() * 6);
char c;
for (int i = 0; i < text.length(); i++)
{
c = text.charAt(i);
if (c < 256)
{
tmp.append("%");
if (c < 16)
{
tmp.append("0");
}
tmp.append(Integer.toString(c, 16));
}
else
{
tmp.append("%u");
if (c <= 0xfff)
{
// issue#I49JU8@Gitee
tmp.append("0");
}
tmp.append(Integer.toString(c, 16));
}
}
return tmp.toString();
}
/**
* Escape解码
*
* @param content 被转义的内容
* @return 解码后的字符串
*/
public static String decode(String content)
{
if (StringUtils.isEmpty(content))
{
return content;
}
StringBuilder tmp = new StringBuilder(content.length());
int lastPos = 0, pos = 0;
char ch;
while (lastPos < content.length())
{
pos = content.indexOf("%", lastPos);
if (pos == lastPos)
{
if (content.charAt(pos + 1) == 'u')
{
ch = (char) Integer.parseInt(content.substring(pos + 2, pos + 6), 16);
tmp.append(ch);
lastPos = pos + 6;
}
else
{
ch = (char) Integer.parseInt(content.substring(pos + 1, pos + 3), 16);
tmp.append(ch);
lastPos = pos + 3;
}
}
else
{
if (pos == -1)
{
tmp.append(content.substring(lastPos));
lastPos = content.length();
}
else
{
tmp.append(content.substring(lastPos, pos));
lastPos = pos;
}
}
}
return tmp.toString();
}
public static void main(String[] args)
{
String html = "";
String escape = EscapeUtil.escape(html);
// String html = "ipt>alert(\"XSS\") ipt>";
// String html = "<123";
// String html = "123>";
System.out.println("clean: " + EscapeUtil.clean(html));
System.out.println("escape: " + escape);
System.out.println("unescape: " + EscapeUtil.unescape(escape));
}
/**
* HTML过滤器,用于去除XSS漏洞隐患。
*
* @author lh
*/
public final class HTMLFilter
{
/**
* regex flag union representing /si modifiers in php
**/
private static final int REGEX_FLAGS_SI = Pattern.CASE_INSENSITIVE | Pattern.DOTALL;
private static final Pattern P_COMMENTS = Pattern.compile("", Pattern.DOTALL);
private static final Pattern P_COMMENT = Pattern.compile("^!--(.*)--#34;, REGEX_FLAGS_SI);
private static final Pattern P_TAGS = Pattern.compile("<(.*?)>", Pattern.DOTALL);
private static final Pattern P_END_TAG = Pattern.compile("^/([a-z0-9]+)", REGEX_FLAGS_SI);
private static final Pattern P_START_TAG = Pattern.compile("^([a-z0-9]+)(.*?)(/?)#34;, REGEX_FLAGS_SI);
private static final Pattern P_QUOTED_ATTRIBUTES = Pattern.compile("([a-z0-9]+)=([\"'])(.*?)\\2", REGEX_FLAGS_SI);
private static final Pattern P_UNQUOTED_ATTRIBUTES = Pattern.compile("([a-z0-9]+)(=)([^\"\\s']+)", REGEX_FLAGS_SI);
private static final Pattern P_PROTOCOL = Pattern.compile("^([^:]+):", REGEX_FLAGS_SI);
private static final Pattern P_ENTITY = Pattern.compile("(\\d+);?");
private static final Pattern P_ENTITY_UNICODE = Pattern.compile("([0-9a-f]+);?");
private static final Pattern P_ENCODE = Pattern.compile("%([0-9a-f]{2});?");
private static final Pattern P_VALID_ENTITIES = Pattern.compile("&([^&;]*)(?=(;|&|$))");
private static final Pattern P_VALID_QUOTES = Pattern.compile("(>|^)([^<]+?)(<|$)", Pattern.DOTALL);
private static final Pattern P_END_ARROW = Pattern.compile("^>");
private static final Pattern P_BODY_TO_END = Pattern.compile("<([^>]*?)(?=<|$)");
private static final Pattern P_XML_CONTENT = Pattern.compile("(^|>)([^<]*?)(?=>)");
private static final Pattern P_STRAY_LEFT_ARROW = Pattern.compile("<([^>]*?)(?=<|$)");
private static final Pattern P_STRAY_RIGHT_ARROW = Pattern.compile("(^|>)([^<]*?)(?=>)");
private static final Pattern P_AMP = Pattern.compile("&");
private static final Pattern P_QUOTE = Pattern.compile("\"");
private static final Pattern P_LEFT_ARROW = Pattern.compile("<");
private static final Pattern P_RIGHT_ARROW = Pattern.compile(">");
private static final Pattern P_BOTH_ARROWS = Pattern.compile("<>");
// @xxx could grow large... maybe use sesat's ReferenceMap
private static final ConcurrentMap P_REMOVE_PAIR_BLANKS = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
private static final ConcurrentMap P_REMOVE_SELF_BLANKS = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
/**
* set of allowed html elements, along with allowed attributes for each element
**/
private final Map> vAllowed;
/**
* counts of open tags for each (allowable) html element
**/
private final Map vTagCounts = new HashMap<>();
/**
* html elements which must always be self-closing (e.g. "
")
**/
private final String[] vSelfClosingTags;
/**
* html elements which must always have separate opening and closing tags (e.g. "")
**/
private final String[] vNeedClosingTags;
/**
* set of disallowed html elements
**/
private final String[] vDisallowed;
/**
* attributes which should be checked for valid protocols
**/
private final String[] vProtocolAtts;
/**
* allowed protocols
**/
private final String[] vAllowedProtocols;
/**
* tags which should be removed if they contain no content (e.g. "" or "")
**/
private final String[] vRemoveBlanks;
/**
* entities allowed within html markup
**/
private final String[] vAllowedEntities;
/**
* flag determining whether comments are allowed in input String.
*/
private final boolean stripComment;
private final boolean encodeQuotes;
/**
* flag determining whether to try to make tags when presented with "unbalanced" angle brackets (e.g. ""
* becomes " text "). If set to false, unbalanced angle brackets will be html escaped.
*/
private final boolean alwaysMakeTags;
/**
* Default constructor.
*/
public HTMLFilter()
{
vAllowed = new HashMap<>();
final ArrayList a_atts = new ArrayList<>();
a_atts.add("href");
a_atts.add("target");
vAllowed.put("a", a_atts);
final ArrayList img_atts = new ArrayList<>();
img_atts.add("src");
img_atts.add("width");
img_atts.add("height");
img_atts.add("alt");
vAllowed.put("img", img_atts);
final ArrayList no_atts = new ArrayList<>();
vAllowed.put("b", no_atts);
vAllowed.put("strong", no_atts);
vAllowed.put("i", no_atts);
vAllowed.put("em", no_atts);
vSelfClosingTags = new String[] { "img" };
vNeedClosingTags = new String[] { "a", "b", "strong", "i", "em" };
vDisallowed = new String[] {};
vAllowedProtocols = new String[] { "http", "mailto", "https" }; // no ftp.
vProtocolAtts = new String[] { "src", "href" };
vRemoveBlanks = new String[] { "a", "b", "strong", "i", "em" };
vAllowedEntities = new String[] { "amp", "gt", "lt", "quot" };
stripComment = true;
encodeQuotes = true;
alwaysMakeTags = false;
}
/**
* Map-parameter configurable constructor.
*
* @param conf map containing configuration. keys match field names.
*/
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
public HTMLFilter(final Map conf)
{
assert conf.containsKey("vAllowed") : "configuration requires vAllowed";
assert conf.containsKey("vSelfClosingTags") : "configuration requires vSelfClosingTags";
assert conf.containsKey("vNeedClosingTags") : "configuration requires vNeedClosingTags";
assert conf.containsKey("vDisallowed") : "configuration requires vDisallowed";
assert conf.containsKey("vAllowedProtocols") : "configuration requires vAllowedProtocols";
assert conf.containsKey("vProtocolAtts") : "configuration requires vProtocolAtts";
assert conf.containsKey("vRemoveBlanks") : "configuration requires vRemoveBlanks";
assert conf.containsKey("vAllowedEntities") : "configuration requires vAllowedEntities";
vAllowed = Collections.unmodifiableMap((HashMap>) conf.get("vAllowed"));
vSelfClosingTags = (String[]) conf.get("vSelfClosingTags");
vNeedClosingTags = (String[]) conf.get("vNeedClosingTags");
vDisallowed = (String[]) conf.get("vDisallowed");
vAllowedProtocols = (String[]) conf.get("vAllowedProtocols");
vProtocolAtts = (String[]) conf.get("vProtocolAtts");
vRemoveBlanks = (String[]) conf.get("vRemoveBlanks");
vAllowedEntities = (String[]) conf.get("vAllowedEntities");
stripComment = conf.containsKey("stripComment") ? (Boolean) conf.get("stripComment") : true;
encodeQuotes = conf.containsKey("encodeQuotes") ? (Boolean) conf.get("encodeQuotes") : true;
alwaysMakeTags = conf.containsKey("alwaysMakeTags") ? (Boolean) conf.get("alwaysMakeTags") : true;
}
private void reset()
{
vTagCounts.clear();
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------
// my versions of some PHP library functions
public static String chr(final int decimal)
{
return String.valueOf((char) decimal);
}
public static String htmlSpecialChars(final String s)
{
String result = s;
result = regexReplace(P_AMP, "&", result);
result = regexReplace(P_QUOTE, """, result);
result = regexReplace(P_LEFT_ARROW, "<", result);
result = regexReplace(P_RIGHT_ARROW, ">", result);
return result;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* given a user submitted input String, filter out any invalid or restricted html.
*
* @param input text (i.e. submitted by a user) than may contain html
* @return "clean" version of input, with only valid, whitelisted html elements allowed
*/
public String filter(final String input)
{
reset();
String s = input;
s = escapeComments(s);
s = balanceHTML(s);
s = checkTags(s);
s = processRemoveBlanks(s);
// s = validateEntities(s);
return s;
}
public boolean isAlwaysMakeTags()
{
return alwaysMakeTags;
}
public boolean isStripComments()
{
return stripComment;
}
private String escapeComments(final String s)
{
final Matcher m = P_COMMENTS.matcher(s);
final StringBuffer buf = new StringBuffer();
if (m.find())
{
final String match = m.group(1); // (.*?)
m.appendReplacement(buf, Matcher.quoteReplacement(""));
}
m.appendTail(buf);
return buf.toString();
}
private String balanceHTML(String s)
{
if (alwaysMakeTags)
{
//
// try and form html
//
s = regexReplace(P_END_ARROW, "", s);
// 不追加结束标签
s = regexReplace(P_BODY_TO_END, "<$1>", s);
s = regexReplace(P_XML_CONTENT, "$1<$2", s);
}
else
{
//
// escape stray brackets
//
s = regexReplace(P_STRAY_LEFT_ARROW, "<$1", s);
s = regexReplace(P_STRAY_RIGHT_ARROW, "$1$2><", s);
//
// the last regexp causes '<>' entities to appear
// (we need to do a lookahead assertion so that the last bracket can
// be used in the next pass of the regexp)
//
s = regexReplace(P_BOTH_ARROWS, "", s);
}
return s;
}
private String checkTags(String s)
{
Matcher m = P_TAGS.matcher(s);
final StringBuffer buf = new StringBuffer();
while (m.find())
{
String replaceStr = m.group(1);
replaceStr = processTag(replaceStr);
m.appendReplacement(buf, Matcher.quoteReplacement(replaceStr));
}
m.appendTail(buf);
// these get tallied in processTag
// (remember to reset before subsequent calls to filter method)
final StringBuilder sBuilder = new StringBuilder(buf.toString());
for (String key : vTagCounts.keySet())
{
for (int ii = 0; ii < vTagCounts.get(key); ii++)
{
sBuilder.append("").append(key).append(">");
}
}
s = sBuilder.toString();
return s;
}
private String processRemoveBlanks(final String s)
{
String result = s;
for (String tag : vRemoveBlanks)
{
if (!P_REMOVE_PAIR_BLANKS.containsKey(tag))
{
P_REMOVE_PAIR_BLANKS.putIfAbsent(tag, Pattern.compile("<" + tag + "(\\s[^>]*)?>" + tag + ">"));
}
result = regexReplace(P_REMOVE_PAIR_BLANKS.get(tag), "", result);
if (!P_REMOVE_SELF_BLANKS.containsKey(tag))
{
P_REMOVE_SELF_BLANKS.putIfAbsent(tag, Pattern.compile("<" + tag + "(\\s[^>]*)?/>"));
}
result = regexReplace(P_REMOVE_SELF_BLANKS.get(tag), "", result);
}
return result;
}
private static String regexReplace(final Pattern regex_pattern, final String replacement, final String s)
{
Matcher m = regex_pattern.matcher(s);
return m.replaceAll(replacement);
}
private String processTag(final String s)
{
// ending tags
Matcher m = P_END_TAG.matcher(s);
if (m.find())
{
final String name = m.group(1).toLowerCase();
if (allowed(name))
{
if (!inArray(name, vSelfClosingTags))
{
if (vTagCounts.containsKey(name))
{
vTagCounts.put(name, vTagCounts.get(name) - 1);
return "" + name + ">";
}
}
}
}
// starting tags
m = P_START_TAG.matcher(s);
if (m.find())
{
final String name = m.group(1).toLowerCase();
final String body = m.group(2);
String ending = m.group(3);
// debug( "in a starting tag, name='" + name + "'; body='" + body + "'; ending='" + ending + "'" );
if (allowed(name))
{
final StringBuilder params = new StringBuilder();
final Matcher m2 = P_QUOTED_ATTRIBUTES.matcher(body);
final Matcher m3 = P_UNQUOTED_ATTRIBUTES.matcher(body);
final List paramNames = new ArrayList<>();
final List paramValues = new ArrayList<>();
while (m2.find())
{
paramNames.add(m2.group(1)); // ([a-z0-9]+)
paramValues.add(m2.group(3)); // (.*?)
}
while (m3.find())
{
paramNames.add(m3.group(1)); // ([a-z0-9]+)
paramValues.add(m3.group(3)); // ([^\"\\s']+)
}
String paramName, paramValue;
for (int ii = 0; ii < paramNames.size(); ii++)
{
paramName = paramNames.get(ii).toLowerCase();
paramValue = paramValues.get(ii);
// debug( "paramName='" + paramName + "'" );
// debug( "paramValue='" + paramValue + "'" );
// debug( "allowed? " + vAllowed.get( name ).contains( paramName ) );
if (allowedAttribute(name, paramName))
{
if (inArray(paramName, vProtocolAtts))
{
paramValue = processParamProtocol(paramValue);
}
params.append(' ').append(paramName).append("=\\\"").append(paramValue).append("\\\"");
}
}
if (inArray(name, vSelfClosingTags))
{
ending = " /";
}
if (inArray(name, vNeedClosingTags))
{
ending = "";
}
if (ending == null || ending.length() < 1)
{
if (vTagCounts.containsKey(name))
{
vTagCounts.put(name, vTagCounts.get(name) + 1);
}
else
{
vTagCounts.put(name, 1);
}
}
else
{
ending = " /";
}
return "<" + name + params + ending + ">";
}
else
{
return "";
}
}
// comments
m = P_COMMENT.matcher(s);
if (!stripComment && m.find())
{
return "<" + m.group() + ">";
}
return "";
}
private String processParamProtocol(String s)
{
s = decodeEntities(s);
final Matcher m = P_PROTOCOL.matcher(s);
if (m.find())
{
final String protocol = m.group(1);
if (!inArray(protocol, vAllowedProtocols))
{
// bad protocol, turn into local anchor link instead
s = "#" + s.substring(protocol.length() + 1);
if (s.startsWith("#//"))
{
s = "#" + s.substring(3);
}
}
}
return s;
}
private String decodeEntities(String s)
{
StringBuffer buf = new StringBuffer();
Matcher m = P_ENTITY.matcher(s);
while (m.find())
{
final String match = m.group(1);
final int decimal = Integer.decode(match).intValue();
m.appendReplacement(buf, Matcher.quoteReplacement(chr(decimal)));
}
m.appendTail(buf);
s = buf.toString();
buf = new StringBuffer();
m = P_ENTITY_UNICODE.matcher(s);
while (m.find())
{
final String match = m.group(1);
final int decimal = Integer.valueOf(match, 16).intValue();
m.appendReplacement(buf, Matcher.quoteReplacement(chr(decimal)));
}
m.appendTail(buf);
s = buf.toString();
buf = new StringBuffer();
m = P_ENCODE.matcher(s);
while (m.find())
{
final String match = m.group(1);
final int decimal = Integer.valueOf(match, 16).intValue();
m.appendReplacement(buf, Matcher.quoteReplacement(chr(decimal)));
}
m.appendTail(buf);
s = buf.toString();
s = validateEntities(s);
return s;
}
private String validateEntities(final String s)
{
StringBuffer buf = new StringBuffer();
// validate entities throughout the string
Matcher m = P_VALID_ENTITIES.matcher(s);
while (m.find())
{
final String one = m.group(1); // ([^&;]*)
final String two = m.group(2); // (?=(;|&|$))
m.appendReplacement(buf, Matcher.quoteReplacement(checkEntity(one, two)));
}
m.appendTail(buf);
return encodeQuotes(buf.toString());
}
private String encodeQuotes(final String s)
{
if (encodeQuotes)
{
StringBuffer buf = new StringBuffer();
Matcher m = P_VALID_QUOTES.matcher(s);
while (m.find())
{
final String one = m.group(1); // (>|^)
final String two = m.group(2); // ([^<]+?)
final String three = m.group(3); // (<|$)
// 不替换双引号为",防止json格式无效 regexReplace(P_QUOTE, """, two)
m.appendReplacement(buf, Matcher.quoteReplacement(one + two + three));
}
m.appendTail(buf);
return buf.toString();
}
else
{
return s;
}
}
private String checkEntity(final String preamble, final String term)
{
return ";".equals(term) && isValidEntity(preamble) ? '&' + preamble : "&" + preamble;
}
private boolean isValidEntity(final String entity)
{
return inArray(entity, vAllowedEntities);
}
private static boolean inArray(final String s, final String[] array)
{
for (String item : array)
{
if (item != null && item.equals(s))
{
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
private boolean allowed(final String name)
{
return (vAllowed.isEmpty() || vAllowed.containsKey(name)) && !inArray(name, vDisallowed);
}
private boolean allowedAttribute(final String name, final String paramName)
{
return allowed(name) && (vAllowed.isEmpty() || vAllowed.get(name).contains(paramName));
}
}
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